We present a framework for reasoning about processes (complex actions) that are constituted by several concurrent activities performed by various interacting agents. The framework is based on two distinct formalisms: a representation formalism, which is a CCS-like process algebra associated with an explicit global store; and a reasoning formalism, which is an extension of modal mu-calculus, a powerful logic of programs that subsumes dynamic logics such as P DL and P DL, and branching temporal logics such as CTL and CTL*. The reasoning service of interest in this setting is model checking in contrast to logical implication. This framework, although directly applicable only when complete information on the system behavior is available, has several interesting features for reasoning about actions in Arti cial Intelligence. Indeed, it inherits formal and practical tools from the area of Concurrency in Computer Science, to deal with complex actions, treating suitably aspects like nonterminating executions, parallelism, communications, and interruptions.
Introduction
In this paper, we present a piece of research that can be regarded as a bridge between the area of Reasoning about Actions in Arti cial Intelligence and the area of Concurrency in Computer Science.
On the one hand, we follow a methodology that is typical of Reasoning about Actions in Arti cial Intelligence for specifying and reasoning about dynamic systems (e.g. see the situation calculus in 49]): introducing a set of facts whose value changes as the system evolves (cf. uents in 49]); specifying e ects of (atomic) actions on such a set of facts (cf. e ect axioms in 49]); devising a suitable means to obtain the successor-state resulting from executing an action in the current state (cf. successor-state axioms in 49]). We also introduce a speci cation of preconditions for executing actions (cf. precondition axioms in 49]). However we allow such a speci cation to change during the evolution of the system (di erently from precondition axioms in 49] ). In addition to this general picture, we allow for multiple atomic actions to occur together (for reasons that will become clear later on, we call the resulting actions synchronized actions instead of concurrent (elementary) actions as e.g. in 24, 42, 2, 5, 50]), and we allow for organizing actions within suitable control structures (sequential composition, parallel composition, iteration, recursion, etc.) by introducing an explicit notion of process in describing the system. On the other hand, we make use of modeling tools that have been developed in the area of Concurrency in Computer Science to formalize concurrent processes, instead of the ones typically used in Reasoning about Action in Arti cial Intelligence (i.e. logics). However, in order to make use of such tools, we need to describe the dynamic system on a more concrete level of abstraction than the one typically adopted in Reasoning about Actions.
In general, we may choose among several levels of abstraction when describing a dynamic system, depending on the information we assume available. We distinguish the following three levels:
1. At a very concrete level, we may characterize the system by its unique actual evolution, which can be represented as a sequence of states/actions. At this level, we assume complete information on each state, and we assume knowledge of which action will be performed next. 2. At a more abstract level, we may characterize the system by all its possible evolutions. In this case, the system is represented as a transition graph, called transition system, instead of a single sequence. The single evolution at Level 1 is represented as a path on such a graph. One of these paths is going to be the actual evolution of the system, yet we do not have the knowledge on which one it is. Each node (representing a state) has several labeled out-arcs which represent the actions that can be performed in that state. Each action causes the transition of the system from the current state to a possible successorstate. We remark that di erent out-arcs may be labeled by the same action. In this case, the action has several alternative outcomes: the action is nondeterministic. At this level, we assume complete information on the possible evolutions of the system: each state is completely known, including which actions enabled to be performed, and each action leads to some completely known state. However, we do not know which action is going to be performed next. Moreover, for nondeterministic actions, it is not known which of the alternative resulting states is going to be the next one. 3. At the third level, we model the system by selecting a set of transition systems instead of a unique one. Each of such transition systems represents an alternative possible behavior. At this level, we assume partial information on the possible evolutions of the system: each state is only partially known, and so are the states resulting from performing an action in it. Generally, Level 1 is considered too concrete: it is unrealistic to obtain such complete information in order to single out a unique system run 1 . Level 2 and 3 instead, have been both used in modeling dynamic systems.
In particular, Level 3 is the one usually adopted by research in reasoning about actions 51, 49, 37, 41, 42, 38, 24] , where a certain logic (situation calculus, dynamic logic, etc.) is used both to represent and to reason about the dynamic systems. The typical reasoning problem of interest in this case is logical implication (validity) in the form ? j = S init )
where: ? are axioms used to select the set of transition systems that represent the dynamic system; S init is a formula, which is a (partial) description of the initial state; is a formula, which is the property we want to prove, e.g. the reachability of a state where a certain property (the goal) holds.
In this paper, we adopt the viewpoint of Level 2. Following the model checking approach proposed in 27], we use a representation formalism to de ne the transition system representing the possible evolutions of the system, and a reasoning formalism (a suitable logic) for specifying properties we want to check. This framework is the one typically used in Process Algebras (e.g. CCS 45] , CSP 30] , ACP 3] ) to model concurrent and reactive systems 2 . Process algebras are generally recognized as a convenient tool for describing concurrent and multiprocess systems. They provide us with a clean way to express parallelism, reactivity, communications, interruptions, coordinations, synchronizations/asynchronizations, etc. Moreover, for nite state processes (processes that can be interpreted on nite transition systems), various practical tools have been developed and implemented to verify whether a given modal/temporal logic formula is satis ed by the process (e.g. 6, 10, 44, 11] ).
The reasoning problem of interest in this case is model checking in the form T ; s init j = where: T is a transition system representing the possible evolutions of our dynamic system; s init is the initial state of T ; is a formula, which is the property we want to prove, e.g. the reachability of a state where a certain property (the goal) holds. 1 However, one can describe a dynamic system by specifying its properties using Linear-time Temporal Logics that are interpreted over system runs (see e.g. 18]). 2 In Arti cial Intelligence, research in search-based planning, including much work on STRIPS (e.g. 8]) can be considered at this level. In contrast, research in deductive planning is typically carried out at Level 3. In our work, the state of the system called con guration, is composed of an active component called process and a passive component called global store. The process describes the activities of all the agents (e.g. robots, persons, pieces of software, subroutines, environment, etc.) in the system. The global store, which is characterized by a set of primitive propositions, describes the state of the world except for the activities that are going on. The con guration can only be changed by the activities in the process, which in fact make the system evolve.
Making use of a global store associated to a process, we specify the e ects of an action in terms of the di erence between the current global store and the resulting one. Properties not mentioned among such e ects are kept unchanged 3 . Note that this treatment is di erent from most of the approaches in the literature on logics of programs 34], where all properties of the state resulting from an action must be speci ed explicitly.
In order to reason about the properties of such modeled dynamic systems, we develop a suitable extension of modal mu-calculus 32], a powerful logic of programs which subsumes dynamic logics such as PDL, PDL 34] , and temporal logics such as CTL, CTL 18] . We show that model checking in our logic can be linearly reduced to model checking in standard modal mu-calculus. By means of this reduction, it is possible to reuse e ciently the existing veri cation tools mentioned above, for reasoning about actions in our setting.
We also discuss two important additional issues: (1) the relationship between model checking and logical implication in our setting; (2) how to identify two representations of a dynamic system. For the former, we device a suitable notion of characteristic formula 53], which is a logical formula that completely characterizes a transition system. For the latter, we introduce a suitable notion of equivalence based on bisimulation 45] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our representation formalism in detail. In Section 3, we discuss the main feature of the representation formalism by illustrating several examples. In Section 4, we present the reasoning formalism and show its ability to express a wide variety of dynamic properties. In Section 5, we show by means of examples, the use of the reasoning formalism for reasoning about actions in the proposed framework. In Section 6, we devise a suitable reasoning technique for model checking in our setting, by reducing it to a standard setting. In Section 7, we discuss the relationship between model checking and logical implication, and the issue of equivalent descriptions. In Section 8, we draw some conclusions and sketch some possible future research directions.
2 Representation formalism: a process algebra with global store
We represent dynamic systems in terms of possible evolutions of the system caused by actions. We call con guration the state of the system at a point of its possible evolutions. A con guration is represented as a pair: (p; ) where p is called process and is called global store. Intuitively, the process describes all the activities that are being performed by the agents in the system { or to be precise, the status of such activities in the current con guration. The global store describes the properties 3 In this way we address the simpli ed variant of the frame problem that arises in our setting.
characterizing the current con guration that do not involve activities being performed. As the activities in the process are performed, both the global store and the process evolve, and hence the con guration of the system changes. We formalize possible global stores simply as propositional interpretations. Before formalizing processes, we need to introduce elementary actions. Indeed, a process carries the information on \which elementary actions are possible next", and for each of such actions, \what is the process left to be performed afterwards".
We consider two kinds of elementary actions: Atomic actions which are basic uninterruptible actions executed by an agent. We assume the set of all possible atomic actions to be nite. Synchronized actions which are constituted by any nonempty set of atomic actions performed together by various agents. Intuitively, to execute a synchronized action means to execute a set of atomic actions simultaneously as a unity. That is, the execution of each atomic action in a synchronized action, implicitly relies on the feedback of the executions of the others. Each action has some e ects on the global store. The speci cation of such e ects is supplied separately from the process by de ning an e ect function. The e ect function speci es the e ects of each atomic action wrt di erent conditions on the global store. On the base of such an e ect function, a successor-state function is de ned which, given a global store and an atomic or synchronized action, returns the set 4 of possible next global stores. 5 Besides e ects, each action has typically some associated preconditions, i.e. conditions under which an action can be performed. In our setting, action preconditions are speci ed within the process. This treatment provides us with the capability of describing action preconditions which depend not only on the status of the global store but also on the status of the process. So a process can, for instance, dynamically block the possibility of executing an action in some con gurations when certain activities are being performed.
Atomic actions
Let Act be the nite set of all possible atomic actions (ranged over by a; b; : : :, possibly with a subscript).
We de ne an e ect function e ct that associates to each action a 2 Act, a nite set of pairs of premise and e ect: e ct(a) = f( 1 ; E 1 ); : : : ; ( n ; E n )g where for each pair ( i ; E i ): 4 Recall that actions are generally nondeterministic, so we have a set of (rather than a single) possible next global stores. 5 Such an approach for specifying e ects is quite similar to that of the A-family action languages 23, 39] .
The premise i is a propositional formula over Prop describing the properties the global store must satisfy so that the corresponding e ect E i can be applied. The e ect E i is a set of literals { atomic propositions or their negations { over Prop that describes a possible e ect of the execution of action a under premise i . The literals in E i are required to be true in the successive global store.
Each pair ( i ; E i ) in e ct(a), can be intuitively interpreted as an assertion that if the premise i is true in the current global store, then there is a possible execution of a that causes the literals in E i to be true in the resulting global store. In other words, the action a under the premise i has E i as possible e ect.
Next, we introduce a simple update operator that, given an interpretation and a set of non-contradictory literals L, returns a new interpretation 0 . De nition Let be an interpretation over Prop Intuitively, the set =a of alternative global stores resulting from executing action a on is formed by one alternative updated global store for each e ect E of a whose premise is satis ed in . For each E, the resulting global store is equal to E, that is, it is identical to except that the values of the atomic propositions occurring in E are changed so as to make E true.
Observe that action a is nondeterministic (wrt the e ects on the global store) in { i.e. =a is not singleton { if more then one premise in e ct(a) is satis ed. It is deterministic (wrt the e ects on the global store) { i.e. =a is singleton 6 { if just one premise is satis ed.
By de nition, if no premise in e ct(a) is satis ed then =a = , i.e. the action has no e ect (though it may still be performed).
Finally, if an e ect E in e ct(a) is contradictory, it will not generate a possible resulting global store in =a. In particular, if every e ect E that has its premise satis ed is contradictory, then action a cannot be executed (thus in uencing the preconditions for performing a) 7 .
Synchronized actions
For synchronized actions (ranged over by , possibly with a subscript), we use set notations with their obvious meanings. In particular, we denote by fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g the synchronized action composed by a 1 ; : : : ; a n 2 Act. Observe that as a special case, we have the synchronized action fag which is in fact simply the atomic action a, i.e. every atomic action is vacuously a synchronized action as well.
We extend the previously de ned successor-state function so as to cope with synchronized actions as follows.
De nition Let = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g, with n 1, be a synchronized action, and a global store Observe that =fag = =a. Intuitively, the e ects of a synchronized action are the sum of the e ects of the participating atomic actions. For example, let a and b be two atomic actions whose applicable e ects in a given con guration are fAg; fBg for a and fC; Dg for b. That is, a is nondeterministic and its e ect is either to set A to true, or to set B to true in the resulting global store, while b is deterministic and its unique e ect is to set both C and D to true. The e ect of the synchronized action fa; bg is either to set A; C; D to true in the resulting global store, or to set B; C; D to true. In other words, fa; bg nondeterministically leads to a global store 6 Note that even if =a is singleton, there may still be more than one resulting con gurations since the current process may evolve in several possible ways by performing a. 7 In fact, it has often been noticed that state change's laws may in uence preconditions of actions, see for example 40].
where either A; C; D is true and all other atomic propositions, including B, remain una ected, or B; C; D is true, and all other atomic propositions, including A, remain una ected.
For actions a; a 1 ; a 2 , with e ct(a) = e ct(a 1 ) = e ct(a 2 ), it is easy to check that, if a is deterministic in { i.e. =a is singleton { then =a = =fa 1 ; a 2 g. However, if a is nondeterministic in { i.e. =a is not singleton { then executing fa 1 ; a 2 g may have di erent e ects wrt executing a. Generally the nondeterminism of fa 1 ; a 2 g increases wrt that of a: fa 1 ; a 2 g still has all the e ects a has, but furthermore it allows to combine such e ects in pairs. For example, consider some resources and two consumers each consuming one resource at a time. Their actions have the same e ect: to consume one of the resource. If two consumers take the action simultaneously, then two resources will be taken out, while if only one consumer takes the action, there will be only one resource taken out.
Let us now consider action fa; bg where the only applicable e ect of a is fAg and the only applicable e ect of b is f:Ag. Then the set of alternative global stores resulting from executing fa; bg is empty: =fa; bg = ;. This means that the synchronized action fa; bg cannot be executed, i.e. the atomic actions a and b cannot be synchronized. In general, in our setting, the e ects of the atomic actions that constitute a synchronized action must be compatible in order to perform the synchronized action. The intuition behind is this: synchronizing two actions means not only to perform them at the same time, but also to perform each of them taking into account the feedback from the others. Actions with con ict e ects cannot be synchronized. For example pushing and pulling a handle cannot be synchronized.
Observe the di erence between performing together actions a and b when they take into account the feedback of each other (as we assume in synchronized action fa; bg) and performing together a and b when they are fully independent. If a and b are independent, it is reasonable to assume that they can be performed together even though they have contradictory e ects 8 .
The contradiction can be resolved into nondeterminism. For example, let fAg and f:Ag be the only applicable e ect of a and b respectively. Both a and b try to set the proposition A to the desired value independently. Nondeterministically, one of the two actions has \the last word" and succeeds. Hence, two resulting situations are possible: one in which A is true, and another in which A is false. This intuition is formulated in our setting by adopting an interleaving semantics for concurrent processes as in CCS (see below).
Finally, note that we have assumed that the e ects of synchronized actions are the sum of those of the component actions. This is su cient for most of the purposes, especially when we consider the additional modeling power that processes give us. Several alternative proposals for specifying e ects of \compound elementary actions" have been considered in the literature, e.g. 24, 42, 50, 2, 5] . Many of these proposals are compatible with our framework (especially those based on A-family action languages 2, 5]). In general, our framework applies whenever it is possible to provide a successor-state function from global stores to sets of global stores.
Processes
We adopt CCS-style constructs to combine elementary actions into processes. CCS, i.e. Calculus of Communicating Systems, is a well-known formalism for expressing concurrent processes, which 8 Discussions on this issue may be found in e.g. 5].
includes processes constructs for sequence, choice, parallel composition, and restriction 45]. We suitably extend CCS in order to deal with global stores and synchronization of multiple actions.
Due to the appearances of recursions, process equations P : = p are used to de ne processes. Here P is a process name and p is a process expression (or simply process). Each process name is associated with a unique process de nition. We will use Proc to denote the set of process names.
Processes follow the syntax below: f j 8( ! %) 2 :( ( ) = tt implies (%) = tt)g where ( ) denotes the truth-value of in , and (%) denotes the truth-value of % in the interpretation over Act obtained by assigning the value tt to the atomic actions in and to those in Act ? . The restriction construct can be used to dynamically restrict the possibility of executing synchronized actions, thus specifying \which group of actions can be synchronized at what time". Note that this construct is an extension of the CCS construct n where is simply a set of atomic actions that are not allowed. The semantics of a dynamic system is given in terms of the transition relation ?! de ned as the least relation satisfying the set of structural rules in Table 1 . Such structural rules have the following schema: antecedent consequent side-condition which is to be interpreted logically as: 8(antecedent^side-condition ) consequent) where 8(: : :) stands for the universal closure of all free variables occurring in (: : :) 9 . In case either the antecedent or the side-condition is missing, they are interpreted as true.
The rules in Table 1 Res: The con guration (pn ; ) can evolve to the con guration (p 0 n ; 0 ) by executing the (synchronized) action , provided that (p; ) can evolve to (p 0 ; 0 ) by executing , and is allowed by i.e. 8( ! %) 2 : ( ( ) = tt implies (%) = tt).
Given an initial con guration (p init ; init ), the structural rules in Table 1 allow us to associate to a con guration a transition system (Kripke structure) whose states are the con gurations reachable from (p init ; init ), via the transitions inferred by using the structural rules.
Let us formally de ne the notion of transition system, and the notion of transition system generated by a con guration.
De nition Given a set P of propositions, and set A of atomic actions, a transition system is a triple (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ), with a set of states S, a family of transition relations R 2 S S, and a mapping from P to subsets of S. 
The transition system generated by the initial con guration describes all the possible conguration's evolutions, and hence constitutes our model of the dynamic system.
Examples of descriptions
The examples in this section illustrate the main aspects of the proposed representation formalism.
Russian Turkey Shoot
In this rst example, we mainly focus on those aspects of the formalism that are common to most formalisms for reasoning about actions, in which the notion of process is not put forward. In particular, we show various instances of e ects, premises, preconditions as well as instances of deterministic and nondeterministic actions. Notably, the process described in the example corresponds to the one implicitly assumed in those formalisms where no process is explicitly speci ed. The transition system obtained from the description is also illustrated.
The scenario of the example is a variant of the well-known Yale Shooting scenario in which we have a turkey that gets killed if it is shot by a loaded gun. The variation consists in adding an extra nondeterministic action spin that represents spinning the gun's bullet cylinder. This action has no e ects if the gun is unloaded. If the gun is loaded instead, then after the action spin, the gun can either still be loaded or be unloaded 10 .
We formalize the scenario by introducing a set of propositions to model the relevant facts, and a set of atomic actions that change the values of these facts: Prop = fLoaded; Aliveg Act = fload; shoot; spin; waitg The e ects of the actions are: e ct(load) = f(tt; fLoadedg)g e ct(shoot) = f(Loaded; f:Alive; :Loadedg)g e ct(spin) = f(Loaded; fLoadedg); (Loaded; f:Loadedg)g e ct(wait) = fg which can be read as follows. Performing load results in having the gun loaded. Performing shoot, under the premise of having the gun loaded, results in having the turkey killed and the gun unloaded. If the gun is unloaded, performing shoot has no e ect. Performing spin, under the premise of having the gun loaded, results in either having the gun still loaded, or having it unloaded. If the gun is unloaded, performing spin has no e ect. Finally performing wait has no e ect in any cases.
In this scenario, at any moment, we can (1) load the gun if it is not already loaded; (2) shoot the turkey; (3) spin the cylinder; (4) wait. That is, at any moment, to perform the action load, the precondition :Loaded must be satis ed, while for the other actions, no preconditions are required (i.e. their preconditions are vacuously tt). We formulate these requirements by means of the following process: P : = (:Loaded ! load):P + (tt ! shoot):P + (tt ! spin):P + (tt ! wait):P Observe that process P is very simple: it performs an action, whose precondition is satis ed, and becomes itself. In other words, while the con guration evolves since the e ects of the actions change the status of the global store, the process remains always in the same status. Obviously, in this case, the number of possible con gurations depends only on the number of possible global stores, which is at most 2 jPropj .
The form of the above process is typical of those formalisms for reasoning about actions that concentrate only on the speci cation of elementary actions, specifying preconditions and e ects for them, and do not specify explicitly any process. In these cases, the following process is, in fact, implicitly assumed (note that it has exactly the form of the one above): P :
where a i are the actions and i are their preconditions.
Once we have speci ed the process and how actions change the global store, for every initial global store, it is possible to compute all possible evolutions of the system. For example, let the initial con guration be described by (p init ; init ) with p init = P and init = fAlive; :Loadedg. From (p init ; init ), using the structural rules in Table 1 , we generate the transition system T in Figure 1 , which summarizes in a graph all possible evolutions of the con gurations of the system. For example, a possible evolution is: (P; What about if we do not have complete information on the initial situation? A straightforward technique to deal with this is to trade the lack of information with nondeterminism. For example, we may pre x the actual process with a sequence of dummy atomic actions that nondeterministically lead to several global stores according to incomplete information on the initial situation. In the above scenario, we may introduce two dummy actions initAlive and initLoaded. Assuming that initially it is known that the turkey is alive but it is not known whether the gun is loaded: Observe that the new initial con guration (Q; q ) is forced to evolve by rst executing the initialization sequence, and then evolve according to the original process P. After executing the initialization sequence, our partial knowledge on the initial situation will be correctly taken into account.
Lifting a Table
In this example, we illustrate a process denoting the concurrent activities of more agents, showing parallel execution of processes (interpreted by interleaving semantics) and synchronization of atomic actions. Interrupts are also brie y discussed. The scenario is the following. A vase is on top of a We formalize the scenario by introducing the following primitive propositions and atomic actions:
The e ects of the atomic actions are the obvious ones: e ct(vaseFalls) = f( ; f:VaseOnTableg)g e ct(downLeft) = f(:DownLeftSide; fDownLeftSideg)g e ct(downRight) = f(:DownRightSide; fDownRightSideg)g e ct(upLeft) = f(DownLeftSide; f:DownLeftSideg)g e ct(upRight) = f(DownRightSide; f:DownRightSideg)g where = ((DownLeftSide^:DownRightSide)_(:DownLeftSide^DownRightSide))^VaseOnTable.
In this scenario, we have three processes going on concurrently: agent A l who may either raise or put down the left side of the table; agent A r who is in control of right side of the table; the environment Env that makes the vase fall o the table as soon as one of the sides of the table is risen while the other side is not. We model these concurrent activities by a process LT de ned as follows: Observe that the vase can fall only when the precondition is satis ed. Furthermore, because of the restriction nf ! vaseFalls^:othersg in LT, whenever the vase has the possibility to fall, it is forced to do so, while all other atomic actions are blocked. 11 Let the initial con guration be 12 :
(p init ; init ) = (LT; fVaseOnTable; DownLeftSide; DownRightSideg):
By making use of the structural rules in Table 1 , it is possible to build the corresponding transition system, as shown in Figure 2 It is possible to check that the behavior of the system is the expected one. For instance, in (p init ; init ), the subprocess Env cannot execute since ( ) = . Instead both A l and A r can proceed performing upLeft and upRight respectively. However, unless upLeft and upRight 11 Note that, if we weaken the restriction in LT to be nf ! vaseFallsg, then we will still force vaseFalls to be executed whenever is true, but the action to make the vase fall will be allowed to synchronize with other actions. Table   synchronize , the condition will be true in the successive con guration and hence the vase will be forced to fall. If the synchronized action fupRight; upLeftg is performed, then will not be true and hence the vase won't fall. Note that, the process Env in LT can be seen as a process which, when certain conditions are met ( ), performs an interrupt (the action vaseFalls) and allows for the further execution of the other concurrent processes (A l and A r ) only when the interrupt is completed (the action vaseFalls terminates). More generally, an interrupt will set the truth-value of certain ags that are in the preconditions of other actions, thus disallowing their executions. In this way, we can build interrupting processes that block the execution of the other processes, execute without interferences from them, and reset the ags only when the interrupt has been fully handled allowing for the other processes to be resumed and continue. Similarly, we can also build processes that block the execution of other processes, without ever allowing them to regain the control. 13 
Relay Race
In this example, we show a more complex process constituted by various subprocesses in which synchronization plays a key role. The example also illustrates a simple but e ective technique to deal with actions that are not instantaneous, but have a duration (see 50, 48, 59] ). Namely, an action that has a duration of \running" is modeled by: (1) an (instantaneous) atomic action startRun denoting the initiation of the action; (2) a proposition Running in the global store denoting that the action has started but not yet completed; (3) an (instantaneous) atomic action endRun denoting the termination of the action.
The scenario is a \relay race" with two competing teams, each composed of two runners. The rules of the race are the following: (1) when the \go" signal is given, the rst runner of each team may start running; (2) when the rst runner reaches the \100 meters line", the second 13 Priorities among processes can also be easily modeled, by inserting suitable ags in the preconditions of their actions.
runner The e ects of the atomic actions are the obvious ones: The process Runner i;2 describes the activities of the second runner of the team i: the second runner starts running provided that the rst process has already reached the 100 meters line, gets the baton from the rst runner, passes the Finish line, and ends running.
The process Team i describes the activities of the team i. It consists of the concurrent composition of the two processes Runner i;1 and Runner i;2 with the restriction that the actions giveBaton i;1 and getBaton i;2 must be performed synchronously. The process CheckWinner describes the activity that establishes if the rst or the second team wins.
The process RR describes all the activities of the system. It consists of the concurrent composition of the three processes Team 1 , Team 2 and CheckWinner pre xed by the action go that starts the race under suitable preconditions, and with the restriction that the actions passFinishLine 1;2 and wins 1 , and respectively the actions passFinishLine 2;2 and wins 2 , must be executed synchronously, thus forcing the activity described by CheckWinner to declare the true winner.
As in the previous examples, by using the structural rules in Table 1 , it is possible to build the transition system generated by the given initial con guration to make explicit all possible evolutions of the scenario.
Translating While programs
As the last example, we show that the process description formalism presented here can easily represent traditional programming constructs like \while" and \if-then-else". In particular, we show how programs of a simple sequential programming language, called While, can be translated into processes. While programs have the following syntax:
::= a j 1 ; 2 j if then 1 else 2 j while do where a is a generic atomic action whose e ects are speci ed by the e ect function as before, and the other constructs are sequential composition, if-then-else, and while respectively.
To de ne the translation, we rst introduce function tr de ned inductively on the structure where nop is a special atomic action which has no e ects on the global store. It is used to re ect the fact that tests are assumed to make a transition. 14 Then, we de ne the translation of a While program as the process tr( ; nil).
14 If such assumption is not made, the translation can be modi ed accordingly.
Observe that the intuitive meaning of the constructs is correctly captured by the resulting process. For example while-loops are translated into processes that behave as follows: rst, the entering condition of the while is tested; if such condition is true then the process behaves as the body of the while followed by the whole while-loop again; if the condition is false then it exits the loop. 15 For example, the following fragment of control code of an elevator: Once we have had a representation of a dynamic system, we can use such a representation to infer properties of the system, like the possibility to reach a con guration where a certain property holds (i.e. where a certain \goal" is satis ed), or the invariance of certain statements, etc. Among the various temporal and modal logics that have been proposed in the process algebra literature for verifying properties of concurrent systems 17, 28, 43], we focus on one of the most powerful logics of programs which is called modal mu-calculus ( 32, 33, 56, 57, 19] ). Modal mucalculus is a logic of programs, which is strictly more expressive than logics like PDL, PDL, CTL and CTL . It has been proposed as a logic for expressing \temporal" properties of reactive and parallel processes in 54, 36, 9, 62, 12, 55]. We refer to the excellent tutorial article 55] for a thorough introduction on modal mu-calculus and its use in the context of concurrent processes.
In this paper, we introduce an extension of standard modal mu-calculus, called M , which allows for boolean combinations of atomic actions in the modalities, and thus, it is suitable to verify properties of systems speci ed in our representation formalism.
The logic M
The logic M is basically constituted by three kinds of components:
Propositions to denote properties of the global store in a given con guration. Modalities to denote the capability of performing certain actions in a given con guration. Least and greatest xpoint constructs to denote \temporal" properties of the system, typically de ned by induction and coinduction. 15 One could de ne derived structural rules for the various constructs of While on the basis of the associated processes, and verify that such rules correspond to those usually associated to such constructs (see e.g. 26]). A thorough discussion on this is out of the scope of the paper.
The formulae of M are de ned on the base of action formulae generated by the following abstract syntax: % ::= a j any j none j :% j % 1^%2 j % 1 _ % 2 : where a 2 A for some xed set A of atomic actions, any is a special atomic action denoting the union of all actions in A, and none is a special atomic action denoting the empty (nonexecutable) action.
The meaning of a generic action formula is given by the satisfaction relation below, where is a set of atomic actions (denoting a synchronized action in general): j = a i a 2 j = any (always) j = none (never) j = :% i not j = % j = % 1^%2 i j = % 1 and j = % 2 j = % 1 _ % 2 i j = % 1 or j = % 2 Note that not all constructs in action formulae are independent. In particular, we have: none = a^:a, any = :none, % 1 _ % 2 = :(:% 1^: % 2 ).
Formulae of M are formed inductively from action formulae, primitive propositions in some xed set P, and variable symbols in some xed set Var, according to the following abstract syntax:
::= A j tt j j : j 1^ 2 j 1 _ 2 j h%i j %] j X: j X: j X where A is a primitive proposition in P, X is a variable symbol in Var, and % is an action formula over A.
The symbols and can be considered as quanti ers, and in the sequel, we make use of notions of scope, bound and free occurrences of variables, closed formulas, etc. The de nitions of these notions are the same as in rst-order logic, treating and as quanti ers.
As usual in mu-calculus, for formulae of the form X: and X: , we require the syntactic monotonicity of wrt X: every occurrence of the variable X in must be within the scope of an even number of negation signs. This requirement guarantees the existence of the least and the greatest xpoints associated with (see below).
The semantics of M is based on the notions of transition system and valuation. Given a transition system T , a valuation V on T is a mapping from variables in Var to subsets of the states in T .
Given a valuation V, we denote by V X=E], the valuation identical to V except for V X=E](X) = E, i.e. for every variable Y ,
Let T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ) be a transition system with mapping propositions in P to subsets of S, and V a valuation on T . We assign meaning to M formulae by associating to T and V an extension function ( ) T V , which maps M formulae to subsets of S. The extension function ( ) T V is de ned inductively as follows: The boolean connectives have the expected meaning.
The extension of h%i includes the states s 2 S such that starting from s, there is an execution of some action satisfying % that leads to a successive state s 0 included in the extension of .
The extension of %] includes the states s such that starting from s, each execution of an action satisfying % leads to some successive state s 0 included in the extension of .
The extension of X: is the smallest subset E of S such that, assigning to X the extension E , the resulting extension of is contained in E . That is, the extension of X: is the least xpoint of the operator E:( ) T V X=E] . The syntactic monotonicity of wrt X guarantees the monotonicity of such operator and hence, by the Tarski-Knaster Theorem 58], the unique existence of the least xpoint.
Similarly, the extension of X: is the greatest subset E of S such that, assigning to X the extension E , the resulting extension of contains E . That is, the extension of X: is the greatest xpoint of the operator E:( ) T V X=E] . The syntactic monotonicity of wrt X guarantees the monotonicity of such operator and hence, by the Tarski-Knaster Theorem 58], the unique existence of the greatest xpoint.
Note that not all the M constructs are independent. In particular, we have: = A^:A; tt = : ; 1 _ 2 = :(: 1^: 2 ); %] = :h%i: ; and X: = : X:: X=:X] where X=:X] is the formula obtained by substituting all free occurrences of X by the formula :X. We also use 1 ) 2 as an abbreviation for : 1 _ 2 .
Let us consider some interesting examples of M formulae (we assume that the scope of and extends to the right as much as possible):
1. h%itt expresses the capability of executing some action satisfying %.
2. %] states the inability of executing any action satisfying %. 3 . hanyitt^ :%] indicates the inevitability/necessity of executing some action satisfying %. 4 . X: _hanyiX expresses that there exists an evolution of the system such that eventually holds. Indeed, its extension E is the smallest set that includes (1) Finally, note that if is closed (no free variables are present in ), as in the examples above, then the extension of ( ) T V is in fact independent of the valuation V. It is usual to say that a closed is true in a state s of the transition system T i s 2 ( ) T V for any valuation V (the extension of is in fact independent of V with closed).
Model checking
In the setting proposed in this paper, the reasoning problem of interest is model checking: given a transition system and one of its states, verify whether a certain closed formula is true in such a state. The formal de nition of model checking in our setting is then the following one.
De nition Let T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ) be a transition system with mapping propositions in P to subsets of S, let s 2 S be one of its states, and let be a closed (no free variables are present) M formula. The related model checking problem is to verify whether s 2 ( ) T V where V is any valuation, since is closed.
2
In the following we abbreviate s 2 ( ) T V by T ; s j = or simply by s j = referring to T only implicitly.
Reasoning about actions
Having presented both the representation formalism and the reasoning formalism, we can discuss how reasoning about actions is done in this setting. The basic idea is to use model checking. that is, the sequence of actions load; wait; shoot can be performed and (necessarily) results in having killed the turkey. Observe that, this is a typical instance of the so called projection problem: given an initial con guration and a sequence of actions, determine the truth-value of a certain fact in the resulting con guration. The nondeterminism of the action spin is re ected in the following property:
that is, the sequence of actions load; spin; shoot may result either in having killed the turkey or not. However it (necessarily) results in having unloaded the gun, since
Consider now the following instance of model checking:
(p init ; init ) j = X: g _ hanyiX:
It expresses the existence of a (not yet determined) sequence of actions that, starting from the initial con guration, can reach a con guration where g is true.
If only deterministic atomic actions are allowed, then the one above is a formalization of the planning problem: it asks for a sequence of actions { a plan { to reach the goal g starting from the initial con guration. Thus, we may do planning by using model checking techniques.
If nondeterministic atomic actions are allowed, the above formalization of planning is too weak since it expresses only the possibility that a certain sequence of actions achieves the goal. For example in the Russian Turkey scenario (p init ; init ) j = X::Alive _ hanyiX is veri ed by the sequence of actions load; spin; shoot, yet the execution of load; spin; shoot does not necessarily achieves the goal of having killed the turkey, as shown in Section 3.1.
However, we can still formalize the planning problem as follows:
haitt^ a]X which expresses the existence of a (not yet determined) sequence of actions that, starting from the initial con guration, necessarily reaches a con guration where g is true. For example in the Russian Turkey scenario (p init ; init ) j = X::Alive _ _ a2Act
haitt^ a]X is veri ed by the sequence of actions load; wait; shoot, but not by load; spin; shoot. 16 Next, consider the case discussed at the end of Section 3.1 where we have incomplete information on the initial situation (in particular, we do not know whether the gun is loaded). Checking whether a property holds in the initial situation is reduced to checking whether
that is, checking whether is true in every con guration right after the initialization sequence 17 . For example, even if we do not know whether the gun is loaded, we can verify that there exists a plan to kill the turkey:
It is easy to see that a possible plan is: load followed by shoot. 16 If concurrency is taken into account, the planning problem become more involved, since issues such as which agent is in control of a given atomic action, which agent is supposed to execute a given plan (or part of a plan), etc., become relevant. Moreover, other forms of planning, which are closer to the synthesis of a control process than to the generation of a sequence of actions, may be more appropriate in this context. Although some of these issues can be tackled within the proposed setting, we do not discuss them further here. 17 Note that, it is always possible to execute the initialization sequence.
Let us now consider the Lifting a We can also prove that whenever the vase can fall, it does fall 18 :
(p init ; init ) j = X:(hvaseFallsitt ) hanyitt^ :vaseFalls] )^ any]X:
Finally, consider the Relay Race scenario as formalized in Section 3. Let the initial con guration be (p init ; init ) with p init = RR and init such that Ready is true. We can verify that at the beginning, the action go must be executed:
That is, in the initial con guration go is executable, and (synchronized) actions not including go are not executable. In fact, it is easy to verify that no other atomic action is executable.
We can also verify that both teams may win: In this section, we derive a technique to perform model checking within the proposed setting. We do so, by devising two transformation functions:
A transformation F from transition systems whose arcs represent sets of atomic actions (synchronized actions) to transition systems whose arcs represent single atomic actions.
A transformation H from M formulae, which allow for boolean combinations of atomic actions in the modalities, to standard modal mu-calculus formulae, which allow only for single atomic actions in the modalities.
The setting resulting from applying such transformations is a standard one for which various model checking techniques have been developed (see e.g. 19, 55] ). Hence, by means of the transformations F and H, we can make use of such model checking techniques.
The idea at the base of the transformations F and H is to reify transitions, i.e. to introduce a new state for each transition, so that the action formula is transformed into a formula on the new state. Figure 3 illustrates the rei cation:
Part (a) illustrates the original transition from the state s to the state t. We have that (s; t) 2 R and s ( t ) is the propositional interpretation associated with s (t). It assigns to each primitive proposition A 2 P the truth-value tt i s 2 (A) (t 2 (A)).
Part (b) illustrates the resulting rei ed transition constituted by the transition from the state s to a newly introduced state, denoted by (s; ; t), and the transition from (s; ; t) to the state t. We require that (1) (s; (s; ; t)) 2 R w 1 and ((s; ; t); t) 2 R w 2 ; (2) s and t be the propositional interpretations associated with s and t respectively (the same as in the original transition); (3) be the propositional interpretation associated with (s; ; t), which assigns to each atomic action a 2 A the truth-value tt i a 2 . De nition Let A be a set of actions and P a set of propositions. Given transition system T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ) with mapping propositions in P to subsets of S, we de ne: F(T ) = (S F ; fR F w 1 ; R F w 2 g; F )
where:
S F = S f(s; ; t) j A; (s; t) 2 R g R F w 1 = f(s; (s; ; t)) j A; (s; t) 2 R g R F w 2 = f(s; ; t); t) j A; (s; t) 2 R g F (p) = fs j s 2 (p)g for each p 2 P F (a) = f(s; ; t) j (s; s 0 ) 2 R ; a 2 g for each a 2 A. In addition, given a valuation V on T , we de ne: Theorem 3 Let transition system T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ) and a M formula. Then for every valuation V on T and for every s 2 S, we have:
Proof First, we show by induction on the structure of % that: Now, we are ready to prove the thesis of the theorem. Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to formulae of the form:
::= A j : j 1^ 2 j h%i j X: j X:
The proof is given by the induction on the number of nested xpoints constructs X: . Inductive case. Let us assume that the thesis holds for the formula with k nested xpoint constructs. We prove it for = X: with k + 1. We recall that, by the Tarski 
Since contains k xpoint constructs, by inductive hypothesis on k, we have:
So it remains to prove that:
: (2) Notice that the two valuations above may di er only on the value of X. If it holds that:
then by straightforward induction on the formation of H( ), we have that (2) holds as well.
Let us prove (3), which can be written as:
By de nition of F on valuations, this reduces to:
which indeed holds by trans nite inductive hypothesis.
Hence, considering (1) and (2), we can conclude that s 2 ( +1 X: ) T V i s 2 ( +1 X:H( )) F(T )
Limit case of the trans nite induction. Let be a limit ordinal, then s 2 ( X: The induction on the nesting of xpoint constructs is completed as well, hence we have proven the theorem. The problem of model checking a standard mu-calculus formula in a nite transition system is known to be in NP \coNP 21] . Model checking algorithms are known that run in (jT j j j) o(k) 22] where jT j is the size of the transition system T , j j is the size of the formula , and k is the number of \alternating" least and greatest xpoints whose variables are one within the scope of the other (see 19] ). Moreover, the properties that are typically of interest can be expressed with a very small number of alternating xpoints (one or two), and hence typically model checking can be performed within a low order polynomial time. By Theorem 1 and 2, such results can be applied immediately to our setting 19 . We conclude the section by observing that, from a practical point of view, the above transformations allow us to use the software tools such as the Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench 10] 20 or the Concurrency Workbench of North Carolina 11] 21 , that have been implemented for the automated model checking of standard modal mu-calculus formulae.
Further issues on reasoning about dynamic systems
In this section, we discuss two important issues related to the representation of and reasoning on dynamic systems.
First, we relate model checking in our setting to logical implication, showing that the former is a special case of the latter. We get this special case when we have enough information to isolate a single model, hence reducing logical implication to the simple veri cation of the truth-value of a formula.
Second, we discuss the issue of equivalent descriptions. In the context of process algebras, the equivalence of two descriptions of the same system has been well investigated and various tools have been implemented for verifying the equivalences. Here we show that the equivalence relation deduced by M coincides with a natural extension of the well-known bisimulation equivalence which has been proved of an experimental impact. 19 Note that the transformation H does not change the number of alternating xpoints. 20 Available at http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/~neil/ExternalLinks/comms94/cwb/cwb.html. 21 Available at http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/eos/users/r/rance/WWW/cwb-nc.html.
Relating model checking to logical implication
In this subsection, we relate model checking to logical implication, following the line of reasoning in 53, 52, 25, 27] . Given a nite transition system T , it is not di cult to build a set of formulae D T that encode T .
Let T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ) be a transition system, the set of formulae D T is obtained by including, for each s 2 S, a formula of the form: The set of formulae D T encodes the transition system T , in the sense given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Given nite transition system T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ), for every s 2 S and every M formulae , we have:
This proposition follows directly from the work on characteristic formulae in 53, 52, 25] , by applying the transformations F and H de ned in the previous section.
The above result shows that model checking can be seen as a special case of logical implication. The set of formulae D T can be seen as providing enough information to essentially single out a unique model, and thus logical implication is reduced to the veri cation of the truth-value of a formula in such a model, i.e. it is reduced to model checking.
Note that, from the practical point of view, using a generic theorem prover for M to do logical implication in D T instead of model checking in T , although possible, is highly ine cient. Indeed D T has essentially the same size as T , and logical implication for M is EXPTIMEcomplete, according to the linearity of transformation H and the EXPTIME-completeness of standard mu-calculus 20, 19].
Equivalent descriptions
A question that naturally arises is when two descriptions of a dynamic system can be considered equivalent. Observe that in this case we are asking about a property of the descriptions which is not necessarily related to properties of the modeled dynamic system.
Adopting an algebraic approach for such descriptions allows us to bene t from the study of equivalence classes on processes, to identify equivalent descriptions 22 . Two main notions of equivalences have been proposed in the process algebra literature: trace equivalence 30], and 22 Good comparisons of various notions of systems equivalences can be found in 16, 61, 60] . bisimulation equivalence 45] . Trace equivalence identi es systems that have the same set of possible runs (traces). Bisimulation equivalence, on the other hand, identi es two systems if during every run whenever one system can perform a certain action, then the other system can perform the same action matching such a move.
Here we focus on bisimulation equivalence, since we are interested in identifying two systems not only on the base of their\traces" (trace equivalence) but also on the base of their \branching behaviors".
We introduce a natural extension of the bisimulation equivalence studied The bisimulation equivalence b can be expressed as a simple formula of rst-order logic with xpoints ( rst-order mu-calculus) 47, 46] . As a consequence, the veri cation of bisimulation equivalence b on nite transition systems can be performed in polynomial time wrt the size of the systems (see e.g. 1]).
We also remark that some investigations have been done to check bisimulation equivalence directly on process descriptions. In particular, algorithms that run in polynomial time w.r.t. the size of process descriptions have been devised for some typical forms of processes 29].
An alternative way to de ne equivalence of descriptions is to make use of logic: two systems are considered as the same i no logical formula can distinguish them (see 28]).
De nition Let Proposition 5 Let T = (S; fR j 2 2 A g; ) and T 0 = (S 0 ; fR 0 j 2 2 A g; 0 ) be two image nite transition systems, and s 2 S; s 0 2 S 0 . We remark that Proposition 5 implies that M is well dimensioned for verifying properties of our descriptions, in the sense that, M distinguishes two transition systems if and only if they are not equivalent according to the bisimulation equivalence b . Or, in other words, it implies that the bisimulation equivalence b captures exactly the notion of distinguishability wrt the logic M .
Conclusion
The research presented in this paper can be regarded as a bridge between the area of Reasoning about Actions in Arti cial Intelligence and the area of Concurrency in Computer Science.
Speci cally, we have presented a model checking based framework for reasoning about complex actions (processes) that are constituted by several concurrent activities performed by various interacting agents.
We have shown that this framework, arisen originally in the area of Concurrency in Computer Science, is well-suited for reasoning about complex actions in Arti cial Intelligence, in the simpli ed but signi cant case of having complete information on the state of the world.
The strong connection with the area of Concurrency in Computer Science has allowed us to make use of the body of results devised in that area in the last decade, and to address issues like nonterminating executions, synchronizations, communications and interrupts, which have been hardly tacked so far in Arti cial Intelligence.
Besides the technical results, this work gives some conceptual tools for better understanding of the issues involved in integrating concurrent processes within Reasoning about Actions in Arti cial Intelligence. In particular, we are referring to:
The separation of the speci cation of how atomic actions a ect the state of the world from the speci cation of the process, as noticed in general for complex actions in 37]. The possibility of specifying preconditions for actions (i.e. establishing when a given action can be executed) within the process in order to have them under the control of the process. This is the choice we have made in our proposal. The need to maintain, together with the information about the current state of the world (the global store, in our case), the information about the current state of the activities that are going on (the part of the process that remains to be executed). Related to the above point, the use of a \single-step" transitions, i.e. transitions that return together with the new state of the world what remains to be executed of the process. In general, this allows for a simple and elegant treatment of both concurrency and nonterminating behaviors (see 14, 15] for a use of \single-step" transitions within the situation calculus). Further technical extensions of the present work are possible along several directions. We outline some of them below.
The rst extension concerns the form of the update on the global store. In Section 2, we have introduced a very simple form of the update to compute the set =fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g of the possible global store resulting by performing the action fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g on (see De nition 2.1 and 2.2).
However, the only essential point to retain precisely the proposed setting is to have some function returning the set =fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g from the inputs fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g and . It follows that we may adopt a more complex form of update, based, for example, on some notion of distance among global stores, and specify e ects of actions as general formulae over Prop instead of literals. Moreover in this case, we can also address indirect e ects by specifying domain constrains that must hold in each global store. Observe that the update we are interested in applies to interpretations, and thus is much simpler than update of theories discussed, e.g. in 31]. Research on A-family action languages, whose semantics is based on de ning a transition function (which is essentially a successor-state function in our terms), e.g. 23, 39, 2, 5], is relevant. Another possible extension concerns the form of the global store. In the present work, we describe the state of the world at a given point by a set of atomic propositions in the global store. That is, the global store can be thought of as a set of boolean variables, one for each atomic proposition. A possible extension is to consider the global store as a set of multi-valued variables, or even as a rst order interpretation over some xed domain. Such an extension can be easily accommodated in our setting. Indeed, the way transition systems are built remains essentially the same, while the logic used for veri cation needs to be extended in order to take into account the new kind of properties expressed in the global store. Research in Databases on query languages based on rst-order logic plus xpoints (see e.g. 1]) and that on complex transactions e.g. 4] are relevant.
Finally, let us consider again the levels of abstractions introduced in Section 1. We believe that it is of great interest mixing representations at Level 2 and at Level 3, by mixing the process algebra approach presented here with the usual logical approach. This would allow us to introduce incomplete information in a better controlled way. For example, we could specify agents whose behavior is completely known by means of process description presented here, and agents whose behavior is only partially known (as happens typically for the environment) by logical axioms. To this end, the research on \loose speci cation" in process algebras 7, 35] , as well as research in knowledge representation on description logics that include assertions about \individuals" (which can be interpreted as a partial description of a transition system) 13], is relevant.
